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Abstract
The
of
The WWW increasingly allows people to create and update content for public access. Some of
this information is collaboratively owned (created and maintained), while other information is privately
owned
owned and maintained (but still publicly accessible). Whereas it is unethical to modify the former for
latter, and this paper gives a design for
covert communication,
communication, it is quite legitimate to do so with the latter,
doing
of the covert message
doing so
so while achieving both plausible deniability and automatic perishability of
(the message disappears unless periodically refreshed by the encoder). Traditional information-hiding
(the
information-hiding
has
has looked at the problem of embedding a message in a static version of an online document, the problem
of doing
doing so
so for
for rapidly evolving document collections has not been considered in the past. This paper
shows that it is possible to do so,
so, and in a manner that actually makes use of
of the rapidly evolving nature
shows
of the documents
documents to achieve the above-mentioned property of evanescence: That the message decays
over time and eventually becomes completely erased unless it is refreshed. Therefore the mark needs
to be continuously maintained as the document evolves, in a manner that prevents the adversary from
to
of the mark to recover it without
knowing who is doing the refreshing yet that allows the intended reader of
any form
form of explicit communication. One advantage of our scheme is that the mark's
mark's reach is now
any
unbounded: It can be read by any authorized entity on the web (anyone with the secret key), and the
reading of it is indistinguishable from normal web access patterns. Another advantage is the "hiding
in the
the crowd" effect:
effect: Many people are updating the documents, thereby providing a cover for the one
person surreptitiously injecting and refreshing the mark, or replacing it with another mark message. We
have also
also demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed technique, and shown that remarkably little effort
have
is required to
to implement our scheme
scheme over today's web.
is
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1 Introduction
Although messages that self-destruct were featured in spy movies, their potential usefulness is not limited
to the original purpose of their self-destruction in such movies, which was to prevent their being read by
a hostile adversary after they had served their useful purpose of communicating the next mission to Mr
Phelps. The case for making such messages perishable includes many possible reasons: (i) Such messages
can become stale and thereby convey misleading information to their intended recipient (e.g., the message
"Alice and Bob are both doing fine" after one of them ceases to be doing fine)
fine) -- more generally, because
information is perishable and becomes stale, useless, or even dangerous as the world changes, it stands to
reason that stealthy messages that convey that information should be similarly perishable and self-efface; (ii)
ifthe
if the message involves a secret key, then the longer it lingers, the more it is likely that it (and the key used to
hide it) may eventually be compromised by an adversary who has enough computational resources (or will
have such resources in the future
future - systems have to be resilient not only against the computational power
of today but also against that of the future);
future); (iii) the desired updating of the message (either refreshing it or
replacing it with another message) by the person who wrote it may become infeasible through that person's
accidental loss of the secret key, loss of access to the online world, or other physical inability to take such
action; (iv)
(iv) the automatic disappearance of the message can be used to communicate the very fact that (iii)
has occurred; (v) the person in charge of removing the message may be negligent, or may erroneously
believe that someone else was supposed to do the removal, etc.
Providing privacy preserving Web-based communication is an active research area [2,
7, 15].
[2,7,
151. Achieving
this is hard because many players (such as authoritarian governments, aggressive marketers, etc) want to
have a complete profile of Web users and a log of their actions on the Web. We propose a private communication channel, that ensures plausible deniability,
deniability, and automatic perishability of the messages. We achieve
this goal through the use of collaborative web content available on the Internet, without unethically interfering with the functionality of these valuable services, and without any need for modification of publicly
available data (defined as data not owned by the sender of the message). In a nutshell, our scheme is based
on pairing a privately owned web page with a collaboratively owned web page, and to use this pair as a cover
document. The embedding changes are only performed on the privately owned web page. A more detailed
summary of this scheme is given in Section 3.
There are many challenges involved
involved in designing such a system:
• how to use, for marking purposes, the content that we cannot modify either because we have no
control over it (e.g., news portals), or because it is unethical to use the ability to modify it for marking
purposes (e.g., wikis, forums)
• heterogeneous content; most published marking schemes assume one type of content, whereas we
are now faced with a semi-structured collection of different content types (text, images, audio, video,
annotations, etc)
• not interfering with the proper functioning of the publicly owned covers used
• providing controlled perishability
• being stealthy while using a publicly accessible cover document (as is customarily required in information hiding)
• providing plausible deniability of the covert communication
• providing high covert communication bandwidth (especially challenging when the document consists
of data that has low embedding capacity, such as text)
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The difficulty of these challenges is exacerbated by the increasing power that a potential adversary can
muster -- the repertoire of information sources for such an adversary now includes forum or blog boards
etc.), web-bots, ISP logs, search engines, web page
(most or least accessed pages, most active member etc.),
engines[9,6],
few.
tracking engines[9,
6], to mention a few.
Our system fulfills most of the requirements listed for a Web based publishing system listed by Waldal. [15]: censorship-resistant, tamper evident, source anonymous, updatable, deniable, fault tolerant,
man et al.
persistent (i.e., no expiration date), extensible, freely available.
available. As will become clear later,
later, the only requirement we do not provide is persistency over time (which is inherently incompatible with a self-destructing
message).
[2])
Previously proposed private communication systems use a third party distributor (e.g., e-mail services [2])
receivers. In our system, the sender does not use a third party
to store and distribute the message to intended receivers.
distributor and therefore has a greater degree of control. The sender also has the option of privately storing
[ l 1, 81) if she/he
shehe wishes to maintain the
the cover document (until it is cached by another Internet company [11,8])
privately owned web page that is used as part of the cover document.
Refer to Section 5 for more information about available systems.
2, we introduce the model of Web content used in the communication channel described in
In Section 2,
this paper. The system overview is provided in Section 3. The experimental framework and results are
discussed in Section 4.

2 Document Models
Before going into the details, we give a brief overview of how our system works. In what follows, by
referring to something as "secret"
"secret" we mean that knowing it requires the key that is shared by the encoder
and decoder of the message.
Perishability is achieved by a secret pairing of every encoder-controlled document (say, d)
d) with a docp(d) that is outside of the encoder's control; we consider a document to be outside the encoder's
ument p(d)
control if it is unethical or against the accepted etiquette for the encoder to use it for stealthy communication
(so although a user may, for example, physically be capable of modifying collaborative content, it would
be inappropriate to modify such content for the purpose of encoding). A document d that is within the
encoder's control contains elements that we refer to as el,
e l , ...
. . . ,el
,el,;d ; if d contains too many elements for us to
encoder's
use, then we choose only a number ld of them (less than the total available).
available). What determines an e/s
ei7srole
H(ei)' Some types of elements
(e.g., pair-selection, mark-encoding, etc) is the keyed hash of it, denoted as H(ei).
ei have a payload, e.g., for a mark-encoding ei the payload consists of the mark's bits that it encodes. Let el
e~
be to p(d) what ei is to d (actually there is more to e!,
e~ than that, but we defer this discussion to the section 3.2
on implementation details). If
If ei has a payload, then that payload is determined by the keyed hash of the
el: H(ei,
el). A change in enough of the elements of p(d)'s will, over time,
H(ei, eD.
concatenation of ei with with e~:
erase the message. See Figure 1.
1.
Encodability is achieved through the latitude we have to modify the individual ei's so they encode both
their intended functionality and (if applicable) their appropriate payloads. This latitude includes, for rich
content, a simple selection and re-ordering of content types, that typically can achieve 22 bits of encoding
even without any modification to any of these rich types (see Section 2.1.1
2.1.1 for more details on this). If
If subset
selection and ordering information for rich types is not enough, or not feasible because some sites disallow
rich content or enforce rigid templates for it, then we resort to modification of the ei's actual contents rather
then their presence and sequence order: We modify some pixels of an image [4],
[4], replace words by synonyms
using robust synonym substitution [14], judiciously inject typos [12]
[12] in domains where they are common
p(d).
enough (blogs, newsgroups), etc.
etc. We will later discuss desirable properties for p(d).
There are 2 models for obtaining the ei's from d, each applicable in a different domain. In free-format
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Figure I:
1: Pairing the elements of privately owned web page with the collaboratively updated web page for
information hiding.
domains we can choose and modify the ei's dynamically so as to maintain the desired pairing and encoding
properties. But in append-only domains (e.g., forum posts, opinion pieces, etc) no modifications are allowed
of the old versions of content: In these, we achieve the net effect of modifying a now-obsolete ei roughly as
d, making sure that H(e)
follows. We append a new element e to d,
follows.
H (e) encodes for e the exact same functionality
ei, thereby signaling to the decoder that the chronologically prior ei is to be ignored and e used in its stead.
as ei,
e j 's of a particular d give more than one of the same functionality as
That is, if successive hashes of all the ej's
another, the decoder always breaks the tie in favor of the more recent one.
As stated earlier, what constitutes the sequence of ei elements is the chronological sequence of (possibly
append-only,
append-only, possibly update-able) posts, comments, essays, etc; so the next item posted would be anyone
any one
ei. Even in the most constrained case for us, when the ei do not have rich
of these logical units, let's call it ei.
content (e.g., only text and tags) we were always able to make that ei (and, if applicable, its concatenation
with pp(d))
( d ) ) hash into what we want; in some sense, we "torture ei until it confesses". In rare cases we resort
to typos, but these are very common (almost expected) in such text-only informal material.
There might be cases (relatively rare) where the append operations have no provision for a chronological
date and time cannot be handled as above; this occurs if, for example, free-flowing text is added without any
information about which paragraph was added on which day (so that the web site shows only the current
snapshot of the document). In that case we use a fixed number of items as our definition of what constitutes
the next ei,
ei, e.g., it could be the next k basic items from the available categories, where a basic item is a
paragraph, or an image, etc. (so the next ei could consist of the next k paragraphs of texts that we append, if
only text is added). A too small value for k runs the risk of not being able to carry out enough modifications
on ei,
ei, whereas a too large value is wasteful.
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2.1
2.1 Embedding
Embedding Channels
Channels
As
H(( eei)i ) and
As mentioned above,
above, an ei
ei has an encoding capacity through making changes to it that modify H
used)
H(ei,
e~).
We
now
briefly
review
what
kinds
of
changes
to
ei
are
made.
This
depends
on the
(if it is
ei
is used) H ( e i , eb).
domain,
domain, specifically whether it allows free-format rich content or not. We begin with the former.

2.1.1
2.1.1 Rich
Rich Content
Wikis are
wiki
are a popular way for
for collaborative content creation, which allow rich content creation. Inside a wilu
website
website usually users can both modify the existing content of individual pages, and add new pages. The
collective
collective review and editing through such liberal content modification allows wiki sites to produce quality
documents.
documents.
A rich content creation web site may offer a wide range of element types to contribute content:
• text in different styles
• headers of different levels

figures
• figures
quotes
• quotes
• lists

links
• external links
• internal links

tables
• tables
• references

tags or categories
• tags

In high quality wikis there are style guides that sketch the general good editing practices. Clearly a wiki
consists of several types of content can be typeset in a variety of
of ways while complying with the
page that consists
style guidelines. A good wiki page can consist of one of the more than 222
222 different ordered
respective style
permutations of the 10
10 types of content that were listed above. The 22 bits that were encoded while staying
permutations
strictly within quality standards of the wiki can be used as a covert channel.
Another popular way of rich content creation is blogs. The blogs can be hosted by a large collection
web site
site like
like wiki pages, but unlike wiki pages blogs are usually not strictly monitored for their content and
web
style. Moreover individual blogs are usually under the control of one user.
style.
This kind of content creation web sites provide an extra latitude for covert communication, since it is
of
possible to communicate 22 bits of information just through the use of simple selection and re-ordering of
content
types
even
without
any
modification
to
any
of
these
rich
types.
content

2.1.2 Restricted
Restricted Content
Content
2.1.2
Some online
online content creation sites offer only one or a very limited number of
Some
of different content types of
of
contribution:
• tags (product tags)
• text (forum messages, comments, etc.)
5

• images (photographs)
• audio
• links (related links, bookmarks)
These sites are usually in the form of collections, and they restrict the users to appending new content and do
not allow modification of existing content. Examples of these include online forums,
forums, newsgroups, product
reviews, and product tags. History pages (pages that list the log of modifications on a page) of individual
(e.g. wikis) also exhibit an append-only characteristic, since older snapshots
pages in rich content web sites (e.g.
of the pages are fixed,
fixed, and these history pages monotonically grow in size as new changes are made to the
respective documents.
The append-only characteristic of these sites constitute an interesting challenge for covert communication. In Section 3 we explore this model further
further and give an algorithm for encoding and decoding using a
covert channel based on it.

3 System Overview
Overview
The system consists of an algorithm that determines which of a document's n links are relevant to the mark
and how they encode their relevant bit(s)
bites) of the mark (e.g. links could be different personal pages in a
community web site).
site). In our implementation, each message bit is encoded in a pair of key-selected links,
only one of
of which is controlled by the message encoder:
encoder: This pairing is necessary for the simultaneous
achievement of the desired properties of encodability and perishability (self-effacing mark). Encoding a
mark's bit using only a link under the control of the encoder would not achieve the desired perishability
property,
property, whence this "mixing"
"mixing" of what is under the encoder's control with a sibling that is beyond such
control. Moreover,
Moreover, the rate of the perishability (does the mark vanish in days,
days, or in weeks?) can be controlled
by selecting a sibling that is rapidly changing (for faster decay) or slow changing (for slower decay).
decay). See
Section 3.2 for further discussion on controlling the speed of message decay.
decay.
For the sake of definiteness we describe the algorithm for B
B bits per pair.
In this section, we will use the append-only
append-only content creation model to describe our system.
system. However it is
free-form modification,
tofree-jorm
modiJication,where the contributors are allowed to delete and modify
possible to generalize it to
existing content (see Section 3.4).
3.4).
The algorithm takes as input (i)
m of which are in
(i) a document that has a set of n links (call this set U), m
D and are designated (as being under the encoder's control),
H; and
D
control), m
m :S
5 n/2;
n/2; (ii) a keyed hash function H;
(iii) a r-bit mark message w == bblI ...
. . . bb,.r . Each link points to a document d with el
el,d elements (their tags,
content or combination thereof).
thereof). The algorithm outputs a judicious modification of the documents pointed
to by designated links, such that a pairing operation using H
H only results in m
m pairs of selected links:
links: One
link of each pair is a designated link from our set, the other is its sibling, pp(( d),
d ) , chosen from one of the n -- m
m
non-designated links.
links. A decoder who has H
H but does not know the designated links can find out the same
H to all links in the document. The process of producing these pairs by the encoder
pairing, by applying H
takes place as follows (keep in mind that the pairing has to be producible by the decoder as well, who has
the keyed hash function but otherwise has no a priori knowledge of which links are designated and which
are not):
1.
1. All of the designated links are made to acquire new elements from categories SELECTION,
SELECTION, PAIRING, EMBEDDING and CANCEL according to their roles. The categorization of elements can be
achieved by partitioning the 2 most significant bits of the hash values of the elements, e.g. 00 for
SELECTION, 01
01 for PAIRING, etc.
etc.
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section, for the sake of simplicity, we use a concatenation of the least significant bits of eleIn this section,
ments from the same type to generate larger bit strings. In practice we use more sophisticated information hiding methods to embed larger amounts of information into one element (e.g., image, audio,
video [4], text [13, 12]).
121).
2. The subset T
T of ITI
IT1 =
= TT/ /BBlinks out of D
D are marked by adding new SELECTION elements (until
the probability that a non-designated link contains more SELECTION elements before the message
decays is within acceptable limits). These new SELECTION elements signal the selected subset of
links in U that encode the message to a decoder that only has the information of H.
H. Let the set of
F=
T.
non-selected links be F
= U -- T.

T , and select a sibling for l1 from non designated links
3. We modify PAIRING elements of each link l1 in T,
with the bit string they generate (i.e., by using the concatenation of the least significant bits of their
hash value as a pointer or id). If a link in T
T is involved in a collision between its choice of sibling
and the choice made by another link in T,
we
T , change some of the PAIRING elements until collision
disappears and another desired sibling is selected.
4. The sorted order of the hash of concatenation of the SELECTION elements of links in T also provides
a way of knowing which ones will encode which bits: The smallest in the sorted order will encode the
B bits of the mark, the second will encode the next B
B bits, etc, until all B
B x ITI
IT1 bits of the mark
first B
IT( bits).
B x ITI
are encoded (we consider the redundancy and error correction as being included in these B
order. For each of them
5. Go through each selected link in T according to the above-mentioned sorted order.
following: add a set of EMBEDDING elements to the link so that the concatenation of the least
do the following:
( e i ,el)
significant bits of H
H(ei,
e~) (i.e., hash of an EMBEDDING element ei and a counterpart element e:
e~ of
sibling) is equal to the B
B bits of the mark that it seeks to encode.
6.
6. Later, if the sibling of a link l1 of T
T unexpectedly turns out to have the wrong mean-time-betweenmodifications characteristics (too small for a desired slow decay, or too large for a desired fast decay
document), then there are two options: i) the hash of
due to changes in public interest to the sibling document),
the PAIRING elements are modified by appending new PAIRING elements such that their hash, as
a seed, selects a suitable item from F
F (one that has the desired characteristic). Of course this has
T . ii) if reusing l1 to
to be done subject to not creating a collision with the choice of another link in T.
elements,
accommodate a new pairing will cause exceeding a stealthiness threshold for its number of elements,
l1 is de-selected using CANCEL elements. A new designated link can be selected to replace its place
in encoding the bits of the message using the same SELECTION tags of l1 if desired.

The decoder operation consists of the following steps:
steps:

T and F
F using the secret key and H,
H, and then compute the sibling information (i.e pairing)
1. Compute T
1.
p( d) for each d in T.
p(d)
T.
2. Sort the documents in T
T according to the hash of their SELECTION elements.

B bits that it encodes jointly with
3. Use the sorted order to read from each of the selected documents B
( e i , el)
its sibling by computing H
H(ei'
e~) for each EMBEDDING element.
SELECTION determines which of the given n links are used for encoding. PAIRING determines which
one of the non-designated documents is paired with each document selected by SELECTION process. EMBEDDING determines the encoded message bit string by the selected link and its pair. CANCELING is
used when there is a need for signaling the un-selected status of a previously selected document.
7

3.1
3.1 How the Mark Decays
Decays
Note the following
following characteristic of our system:
system: Extensive changes to a non-designated link does not do
more
damage
to
the
mark
than
more
modest
changes to that same link. Rather, the damage occurs from
more damage
if
each
of these modifications is modest) that, over time, eventumodifications
done
to
many
links
(even
modifications
ally
ally overwhelm the built-in redundancy and error-correction (which are needed for a practical operational
of the mark
consideration discussed below). The primary mechanism we use for controlling the lifetime of
(when
(when it is
is not refreshed) is therefore not the amount of the redundancy and error-correction we introduce,
- the frequency with which they are likely to
but rather our choice of the characteristics of the sibling links be updated based on past observations of their behavior.
behavior. What if that previously observed behavior changes
against our expectation, e.g.,
e.g., a link that was rapidly changing when we selected it as sibling becomes largely
of our mark, we refresh the
dormant after a period of time.
time. To
To avoid
avoid this damaging the perishability property of
mark so
that
a
new
sibling
gets
selected
instead
(one
with
a
more
appropriate
mean-time-between-updates
so
mean-time-between-updates
value).
value).

3.2
3.2

Controlling
Controlling the pace of perishability

It is
is quite
quite likely
likely that we may not find
find public documents that undergo changes at exactly the rate we need to
mismatch
achieve
achieve our targeted pace of perishability.
perishability. This subsection discusses how we overcome a possible mismatch
between our needs and what is available.
available. We use two basic techniques: A slowdown technique for the case
where
where the paired documents are too fast-changing for our needs, and a speedup technique for the opposite
of these in turn.
tum.
case where
where the paired documents are too slow-changing for our needs. We now discuss each of
We
We made the
the assumption that changes to paired non-designated pages will localize at element level (e.g.,
[1] that the amount of
of changes
a paragraph of text).
text). This assumption is supported by analysis of Buriol et. al. [I]
of one
to
to a page in Wikipedia have stayed roughly the same throughout the Wikipedia history at the level of
short
short paragraph at a time.

3.2.1 The
The slowdown
slowdown technique
technique
3.2.1
We temporarily assume
assume that the number of embedding elements of d is no greater than lp(d)
We
lp(d) (the number of
of
p ( d));
d ) ) ; although this is a reasonable assumption in view of the fact that public documents tend
elements in p(
elements
to be larger than private ones (e.g.,
(e.g., Wikipedia grows over time, whereas a student's web page tends to stay
to
relatively small),
small), we will later on discuss how to avoid this assumption.
relatively
(say, t)
t) embedding eis of d will be paired with the concatenation of
of one or more elements
Each of the (say,
p ( d ) , and
and it is
is this
this concatenation that we called e~
e: in the previous sections. The number of
of p(d),
of elements (call
A) of p(
p ( d)
d ) that make up one e~,
e;, is determined by the desired slowdown factor s,
s, by t, and also by the total
itit ).)
l P ( d ) in p
d ) . Specifically we choose
elements lp(d)
p(( d).
number of elements
). = lp(d)

ts
By way of example, assume the number of embedding eiS
eis in d
d is t =
= 5. Suppose we have a pp(( dd)) that
changes 10
10 times faster
faster than we like,
like, and that it consists of (say) lp(d)
lp(d) =
= 50 elements (e.g., paragraphs). In
changes
that case we need a ).A of
50

).=--=1

5 * 10

Using the keyed hash function of the 5 embedding ei's in d, we select for each ei a single element of
of
p ( d)
d ) to
to act as
as its
its e~.
e:. As only 5 of the 50 elements of pp(( d)
d ) impact the embedded message, the probability
p(
probability that
p ( d)
d ) causes
causes damage to the message is only 0.1.
0.1. Notice that the use of
of the keyed hash function to
a change in p(
8

select the eis
e~s has the effect that, irrespective of the likelihood of change in the 50 elements of p(d) (e.g., even
if that distribution is nonuniform), the probability that a change in an element of p(d)
p( d) impacts our embedded
message is now 0.1, i.e., we have achieved the desired slowdown of a factor of 10
10 not only through the
judicious selection of A,
>., but crucially through the randomization done by the use of the keyed hash.

3.2.2 The speedup technique
( e l , e;)
. . .H
( e t , ei)
Suppose that in the previous sections, instead of H
H(el'
e~) ...
H(et,
e~) being used as the encoding mechad,p(d),
nism for the pair d,
p( d), it was the following:

Although this would not change the probability that a modification in one of the elements of p(d)
p( d) will
damage the mark, it does amplify t-fold the number of mark bits damaged in that case. This is indeed one
mechanism for achieving a speedup of the decay.
The speedup can be further enhanced by increasing the size of the portion of p(d)
p( d) that can affect the
mark until in eventually includes alllp(d)
all lp(d)elements of p(d).
The above mechanism is probably enough in many situations, but it could be the case that an even faster
decay is needed than what can be achieved by the above damage-amplification process. In that case we
following method. We use a one-to-many mapping for the pairing function p(.), i.e., p(d) is no
resort to the following
longer a single document but a concatenation of multiple documents. In fact this method can even be used in
< lp(d)
lp(d)does not hold: It can be forced to hold by using
the slowdown technique in case the assumption of
o ft <
a large enough multiplicity for the p(.)
p(.) function (although as we stated above, this will occur very rarely).

3.3

Operation Issues
System Operation

just prior to a read
A burst of updates could be done to many nodes not under the control of the encoder, just
attempt by the decoder and before the encoder has a chance to react to the change and refresh the mark.
mark.
Although redundancy and error-correction can mitigate the effects of this (i.e., the mark can survive), it is
possible that the sudden updates are so extensive as to overwhelm the mark. What happens in such a case
? The reader (i) recovers the wrong mark, that he is therefore unable to decrypt into something that makes
sense (it decrypts to random gibberish); then (ii) the reader backs off from the read attempt and tries to read
involves a rendez-vous time between
again at a later time. We believe this to be preferable to a solution that involves
the encoder and the decoder (e.g., one refreshes at 4:55PM and the other reads at 4:57PM), which would be
awkward and unnecessarily constrain the system's operation. Such a rendez-vous mechanism has its uses,
however, if one wants to deliberately create an evanescent mark, which is a mark that fleetingly
fleetingly appears then
is promptly read and erased immediately thereafter by the encoder.
encoder. Such a rendez-vous mechanism also
fleeting changes that will not have
increases the communication bandwidth because the encoder relies on fleeting
to stand up to the scrutiny of the other readers of the public information forum being used (the "problem"
fixed relatively fast,
fast, before the complaints roll in).
introduced in encoding gets fixed

3.4

The Case of Free-Form
Free-Form Modification
Modification

Recall that this is when we are not constrained to operate in append-only mode when modifying d, i.e., we
can modify the individual ei's so as to carry
cany out the modifications we seek.
seek.
H(ei), whereas its
Recall that the functionality of an ei is governed by the two most significant bits of H(ei),
H(ei,p(d))
where p(d) is the sibling of d and £
payload is governed by the £least
!least significant bits of H
(ei,p(d)) wherep(d)
!depends
on the functionality (e.g.,
(e.g., if ei encodes 20 bits of the mark then £
!== 20). We distinguish two cases.
cases.
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The first case is when the update is not supposed to change the functionality of an ei,
ei, only its payload.
This is the most frequent update and happens when, e.g., we still want ei's functionality to be an encoding
H(ei,
one, but we want to change ei so that the £
e least significant bits of H
( e i ,eD
e:) are restored to their original
p( d). Recall that such changes
value, which they now deviate from because of a modification that occurred to p(d).
that occur to p(d)
p(d) are beyond the encoder's controlcontrol - the encoder merely responds to them by modifying ei
so as to restore the correct value to the £
H(ei, eD.
e least significant bits of H(ei,
e!,).The encoder will, on average,
need to apply 22+£
22+e modifications to ei before he manages to give their target value to the 2 +
f£
e bits that
he is trying to control. The encoder achieves
achieves that capacity by a multiplicity of methods. One of these
involves
involves trying different subsets of rich content types for inclusion in the new ei,
ei, and for each subset trying
all possible orderings of these types. This usually gives the power to carry out the job, without the need to
apply different modifications to these types. Specifically,
Specifically, if there are x types, then the number of different
orderings of all their different subsets is
x

5 ! / ( xI: x!j(x

-

i)!

i=l

For typical rich content, the log2
log2 of the above gives 22.5, hence an encoding capacity of around 22
bits, making possible an £e =
= 20 without the need to modify each individual type when refreshing the mark
(capacity can be much increased if we are willing to make such changes to text, images, etc).

4

Experiments:Making of WaneMark

We have implemented our system to work as a plugin through a browser based interface, where the user
is provided with a Javascript based code that can be run by clicking
cliclung on a bookmark in the toolbar (See the
bookmark labeled as "WaneMark" in the screen shot shown in Figure 2). When the bookmark is clicked a
text area is dynamically created inside the browser window.
window. The user enters the secret key,
key, the paired URL
(In the current implementation this is just
just a label of a Wikipedia page.), and a secret message. Encoding
is performed in three steps.
window,
steps. At every step user highlights a part of the text in the text preview window,
and hits the "Try
'Try Encode" button. WaneMark modifies the highlighted text. The current system leaves the
trailing piece of the highlighted text that does not contribute to the encoding intact; the remaining portion
can be used for encoding other parts of the message. The user approves the changes by hitting the "Accept
Changes" button and proceeds to the next step.
See Figure 2 for a screen shot of the current system operating on a third party blogging interface. [More
detailed information about our experiments will be provided in the camera ready copy of our paper including
the traffic analysis of dynamically changing pages. We can characterize the updates to non-designated links
by their mean-time-between-updates.].
A demo of our implemented system is available at
http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/utopkara/wanemark.
http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/utopkara~wanemark.
Note that WaneMark can use different steganography algorithms as plugins. In our proof-of-concept
implementation, we have used a typographical-error based information hiding technique that mimics errors
of a human for modifying the text elements on web pages [12].
[12]. However,
However, there are many other methods
available for performing the same task [14,
[14, 13,3,
13,3, 10,
10, 17,
17, 16].
161. Non-text elements can be used for information
carrying using image, audio and video steganography techniques available in the literature [4].
[4].
The current implementation is a bookmarklet, and does not have permissions to operate on sites other
than the test site.
site.
We use 16-bit labels to mark SELECTION, PAIRING and EMBEDDING elements.
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2: Screen shot of the WaneMark system operating on a test interface. Each paragraph helps carrying
Figure 2:
16
16 bits for SELECTION,
SELECTION, PAIRING and EMBEDDING.
EMBEDDING.

5

Related Work

Our system aims to mitigate the problem of establishing a truly private web based communication channel.
As also mentioned by Butler et al.,
aI., users of web based communication services have the right to expect that
[2].
their messages will only be read by the intended recipients, and should be guaranteed of their privacy [2].
As a solution, they propose a scheme that uses several communication channels (different online e-mail
services) simultaneously to deliver a steganographically marked text message that carries the secret message
embedded in it and the cryptographic keys that are required to decode and decipher the message. Similarly,
a form of private communication can be provided by the use of secure email tools such as Privacy Enhanced
¥ail (PEM), Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (SIMIME)
(S/MIME) and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [5].
[5].
Mail
But none of these tools can hide the fact that there is a communication going on between the sender and the
receiver.
receiver.
follows: censorshipWaldman et al.
al. [15] listed the required properties of a Web based publishing system as follows:
resistant, tamper evident, source anonymous, updatable, deniable, fault tolerant, persistent (i.e. no expiration
Publius, a web based publishing system
date), extensible, freely available.
available. In the same paper, they introduce Publius,
that provides these requirements. Publius spreads the data of an anonymous publisher to several servers,
such as each server receives an encrypted Publius content (some random looking data) and one of the key
K, into several keys. Any k of n key shares can
shares that was generated by splitting the publisher's key, K,
K. The publishing process produces a special URL that is used to recover the data
reproduce the original K.
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and the
the shares.
shares. To
To browse content, a retriever must get the encrypted Publius content from some server and
k of the
the key shares.
shares. Any modification to the encrypted content or the special URL, that is cryptographically
cally tied to
to the content, will make it impossible to retrieve the unencrypted data. Publius also provides a
mechanism for
of the
for the publishers to update or delete their content. Unlike Publius, where the persistence of
messages and reaching to public are driving
of perishability
perishability of
of
driving goals, our system is based on the design goal of
the
of the message.
the messages, and providing a secure communication only with the intended recipient of
Readers are
are referred to [7]
[7] for a survey of privacy enhancing technologies for the Internet.

6 Future Work
There is
of these below.
is room for
for wringing some inefficiencies out of our scheme. We briefly discuss some of
In the append-only mode, we need to design a finer granularity of modifications for the ei that have
an encoding functionality.
functionality. The difficulty
difficulty is that, if we were to do so in the natural way (by spreading the
encoding task of ei
ei into a number of smaller elements) then we need a mechanism for specifying which one
of the
the smaller elements (and possibly even which specific bit in it) we are modifying. This "random access"
feature
feature achieves a substantial saving only if the number of bits encoded is large enough. It also complicates
implementation.
In the case of free-flowing
of k (how
free-flowing text without chronological time-stamp information, the choice of
many basic units form
of the basic units
form an ei) can be made more flexible and dependent on the nature of
appended rather than their number.
number. This would recognize the fact that some items (like images) have larger
potential for
of weights to each such type
for modification than others (like tags or text). One could assign a set of
and kI% would be the threshold accumulated weight at which an ei is considered to have been created. In such
and
a scheme
an image could, literally,
literally, be worth a thousand words.
scheme an

7 Conclusion
has a long and distinguished history,
history, dating back to five centuries BC. It is useful whenever
Steganograpy has
whenever
the very existence of the secret message is to remain hidden, as in authoritarian countries that severely limit
the
and censor speech. This paper describes a keyed scheme for posting secret messages on the web such that
anyone with the secret key can retrieve the messages, but even a computationally powerful adversary (e.g.,
a government with supercomputers) who does not have the key is not able to know (let alone prove) the
existence: The message depends on web-wide content, not only on what is under the sender's
message's existence:
sender's
control.
If
the
sender
is
prevented
from
erasing
the
message,
the
actions
of
others
on
the
web
automatically
control.
of
automatically
care of doing
doing the erasing job on the sender's behalf. Moreover, the sender can control, a priori, the
take care
likely life of the secret message before it automatically disappears, by a judicious
judicious design of
of the "pairing"
"pairing"
function with the web's sibling information.
function
scheme is
is primarily destined for thwarting censorship. There have been many rumors, none substanOur scheme
tiated, of evil-doers using steganography for communication - investigations in that direction have turned
up no evidence of this.
this. This is probably because evil entities like organized crime (including drug cartels
up
and terror networks) have other and more effective ways of communicating, ways that are not available to
an isolated individual, with limited resources, living in a repressive country.
country.
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